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 The Economic Effects of State Trading Enterprises: 
Market Access and Market Failure 
 
1.  Introduction 
In the Doha Round of trade negotiations the overarching theme is special and differential 
treatment for the developing and least-developed Members of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).  As a consequence, in the agricultural component of these negotiations, the emphasis 
is now more on market access than it is on the other two pillars (domestic support and export 
competition) because of the need to improve the opportunities for the developing and least-
developed countries to increase the values of their exports of agricultural products, especially 
those to the developed countries.  In the early phases of the negotiations, importing STEs 
were on the agenda because it was claimed they restrict imports and exporting STEs were 
placed on the agenda because it was believed they act like an export subsidy and 'unfairly' 
increase exports (see WTO, 2004c).  In both cases, it was claimed that, because of the lack of 
transparency in their commercial undertakings, STEs are 'unfair' traders.  Nevertheless, by 
July 2004, only exporting STEs remained as an explicit agenda item (WTO, 2004b) and since 
the Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in December 2005, the situation has remained 
unchanged (see WTO, 2005b).  However, there is no reason to suppose from an economic 
perspective that if exporting STEs are thought to distort trade, that importing STEs will not 
also distort trade. 
  Importing country STEs are the focus of this paper. We argue that the failure to deal 
with importing country STEs is a missed opportunity in the WTO negotiations since STEs 
limit market access and act in a manner similar to more traditional policy instruments such as 
tariffs. Thus, the focus in the negotiations on export STEs is skewed which means that the 
issue of STE will be only partially dealt with and that market access opportunities will 
continue to be restricted in the presence of importing STEs. We set out a theoretical   2
framework to highlight these issues and apply it to the case of the Korean STE responsible 
for managing imports of rice. The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present an 
overview of the STE issue in the context of the Doha Round negotiations and the status of 
state trading enterprises in the context of the WTO. We also outline some general issues 
concerning STEs in a formal modelling set-up. The trade effects of an importing STE are 
derived in section 3 and the corresponding domestic producer effects are given in section 4.
1 
The welfare effects in the importing country and exporting region are given in section 5.  
Importantly, the approach we have developed can be used to provide estimates of the impact 
of STEs using observable data. We illustrate this with a case study of the STE used to 
manage rice imports in Korea which is presented in Section 6. A summary of the approach 
used and some conclusions about the trade distorting effects of STEs are presented in section 
7.
2  
2.  Current Perspectives on the STE Issue 
  In the Doha Round proposals of the major players (the European Communities, Japan 
and the United States), there appears to be a presumption that the exclusive or special 
privileges given to state trading enterprises provide them with domestic 
monopoly/monopsony powers and that these powers distort international markets and 
circumvent international obligations.  However, it is also evident that some small countries 
take the view that a state trading enterprise is a beneficial policy instrument which provides 
stability, food security and countervailing power.  For example, the submissions by the 
Mercosur countries (together with Chile and Colombia) (WTO, 2001c) and the United States 
(WTO, 2000a) took a balanced position in which both exporting and importing STEs were 
thought to distort international trade and to create an 'unfair' advantage for countries which 
                                                 
1 The domestic tax/subsidy effects of STEs on domestic consumers are not pursued here in the interests of space. 
2 Given the complexity of the model and limitations on space, we confine the discussion in the paper to the basic 
set-up of the model, the issues that are being dealt with and the intuition for the effects that arise. An extended 
version of the paper with the relevant details is available.   3
used them and greater disciplines were proposed for both.  In the submissions made by the 
European Communities (WTO, 2000b), Japan (WTO, 2000c) and Korea (WTO, 2001a), it 
was argued that exporting STEs distort trade and that greater discipline is required; but it was 
also claimed by Japan and Korea that importing STEs do not distort international trade and, 
therefore, there is no need for further discipline to be imposed on them.  Amongst the 
developing countries, both Mauritius (WTO, 2000d) and Mali (WTO, 2001b) argued that 
STEs play an important role in overcoming the market failures of unstable prices and 
imperfect competition and that, in the absence of other instruments to correct these failures, 
STEs play a necessary role and they ought to be allowed to continue in that role.  In the case 
of the developed countries, STEs are invariably used as an instrument to correct these same 
market failures but they are also used as an instrument to redistribute income to producers.  In 
developing countries, the redistribution is often towards consumers.
3 
  The pursuit of the twin objectives of efficiency and redistribution through the use of 
STEs makes their economic analysis a challenge.  There are four elements to this challenge.  
First, to the extent that STEs are used as an instrument of redistribution, they are like most 
other instruments of agricultural policy and reflect a bias in government policy, a bias that 
varies not only from country to country but also over time.  An STE may also act as a price 
stabilisation mechanism in the absence of other risk-reducing instruments such as futures 
markets. In the absence of competition policy, an STE is a means of reducing the oligopsony 
power exerted by firms downstream from producers and the oligopoly power exercised by 
these firms against final consumers. At the same time, an importing STE may also use its 
position to improve the country's terms of trade and an exporting STE may gain a share in 
export markets in excess of that achieved by private firms. 
                                                 
3 It may be concluded that the objectives, exclusive rights, activities and types of STE are many.  See OECD 
(2001) for a description of them.   4
  The second element is to know what the market structure would be in the absence of 
the STE or if its exclusive rights were weakened.  Clearly, any distortion of trade created by 
the STE has to be measured against some alternative structure.  Since it is not known what 
this structure would be, the model has to be sufficiently flexible to provide a range of 
alternatives.  The third element is to place some bounds on the possible range of exclusive 
rights granted to STEs and on the objectives being pursued by it.  At one extreme could be 
the archetypal single-desk STE which acts in a way which is biased towards either producers 
or consumers; at the other could be a partially deregulated STE which competes with a given 
number of private firms, competition that could be based upon either price or quantity as the 
strategic variable for a product that is either homogeneous or differentiated.  The fourth 
element is recognition that, as well as the international effects of an STE which can be 
represented as equivalent to an import tax/subsidy or an export tax/subsidy, there is also the 
domestic producer and consumer tax/subsidy equivalents to take into account.  Hence, STEs 
belong in each of the pillars in the agriculture negotiations rather than just the export pillar as 
at present. 
  The negotiations on STEs need to be understood in the context of their status in the 
GATT/WTO.
4  In the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, a state trading enterprise is defined as: 
Governmental and non-governmental enterprises, including marketing boards, which have 
been granted exclusive or special rights or privileges, including statutory or constitutional 
powers, in the exercise of which they influence through their purchases or sales the level 
or direction of imports or exports. (WTO 1995, p. 25) 
It is important to note that the ownership of the STE is not a criterion for an enterprise to be 
classified as an STE.  It is purely the existence of exclusive rights that define an STE and 
which distinguishes it from a commercial firm.  It was understood from the inception of 
GATT 1947 that state trading enterprises have the potential to distort trade (see Article 
                                                 
4 For a recent description of STEs in the WTO, see WTO (2005a).   5
XVII:3).  However, their ability to do so is curtailed by Article XVII:1(a) through which 
STEs are required to act in a manner consistent with the GATT principle of non-
discrimination and most-favoured nation treatment (Article I);  and by Article XVII:1(b) 
through which they must act on the basis of commercial considerations.
5  State trading 
enterprises in importing countries are not allowed to maintain mark-ups higher than the 
bound tariff levels (Ad Article XVII:4(b)) and these mark-ups should be transparent and 
notified to interested Members (Article XVII:4(b)).  Importantly, in the context of the 
submission made by the European Communities and the disquiet expressed in it about price 
discrimination, STEs in exporting countries are permitted to price discriminate amongst 
markets (Ad Article XVII:1) (WTO, 1995). 
  In order to analyse the trade effects of an STE it is necessary to define its exclusive 
rights, if any, and its objective function.  While the objective of importing and exporting 
STEs may be identical, their exclusive rights are partly determined by whether they import or 
export.  In what follows the analysis is limited to the importing country case.
6  It is shown 
that they do interfere with market access and, for that reason, they will compromise the 
provision of special and differential treatment for developing countries where they export to 
countries which use STEs to import. 
3.  Importing STEs: the effect on market access 
  Consider a large importing country in which the STE, as a marketing firm, has 
exclusive rights over procurement of a product from domestic producers, along an upward 
sloping, linear supply function, and the exclusive right to import, i.e., it has single desk status.  
The exporting region is perfectly competitive, thereby allowing an upward sloping, linear 
                                                 
5 In a recent WTO Dispute Panel ruling (WTO, 2004a) involving the United States and the Canadian Wheat 
Board, it was concluded by the Panel and supported by the Appellate Body that commercial considerations and 
profit maximisation are not synonymous and that only the former matters in the context of Article XVII. 
6 The exporting and importing cases require models of different structures and space here does not permit 
presentation of both models.  Some aspects of the exporting case are to be found in McCorriston and MacLaren 
(2006).   6
import supply function to be defined.  The domestic and imported product are homogeneous 
in domestic consumption which is determined by a downward sloping, linear demand 
function.  The objective of the STE, defined by government, is to maximise its payoff 
function which contains as arguments, producer surplus (PS), consumer surplus (CS) and 
profits (π).  The maximisation is carried out with respect to the quantity to be procured 
domestically (
STE
d Q ) and the quantity to be imported (
STE
m Q ).  Specifically, let the STE's 
payoff function be defined as 
  123 () dm WP SC S =α +α +α π +π  (1) 
where:  πd refers to profits on product procured domestically and πm to profit on the imported 
product;  and the αs represent the policy weights which reflect the government's policy bias.  
Normalising on  3 α , let  P 13 α= α / α  and  23 / C α =α α . Then, reflecting the typical bias of 
agricultural policies across developed and developing countries, we have αP > αC in the 
developed country case, and αP < αC  in the developing country case.
7 
  In the absence of the STE, assume that the domestic industry is an n-firm, Cournot 
oligopoly, hereafter referred to as the benchmark, in which each firm maximises profit, 
i π , 
defined as 
 
iiiP i e i
dm d m s qt q π= π+ π + +  (2) 
The variable 
e t  is the tariff equivalent of the STE and is explained below and 
P s  is the 
producer subsidy equivalent of the STE and is explained in section 4.  The ith firm procures 
the quantity 
i
d q  domestically, it imports 
i
m q , and maximises 
i π  with respect to these two 
variables. 
                                                 
7 We do not pursue here other possible objective functions such as maximising social welfare ( 1 PC α= α=) or 
maximising profit ( 0 PC α= α=).   7
  In order to develop the intuition for the results which follow, compare the quantity 
imported by an STE which has a bias towards producers (by solving the first-order conditions 
from maximising equation (1) with respect to 
STE
d Q  and 
STE
m Q ) and the quantity imported by 
the benchmark which, for the moment, is defined as a private monoposonist/monopolist (by 
solving the first-order conditions from maximising equation (2) with respect to 
i




Such a firm will behave identically with the STE as far as imports are concerned by 
exploiting the country's terms of trade but it will behave very differently with respect to 
domestic procurement.  It will exploit its monopsony power by restricting purchases from 
domestic producers and it will exploit its monopoly power by restricting sales to domestic 
consumers.  On the other hand, an STE which places some weight on producer surplus, as 
well as profits from sales, will purchase more from domestic producers than the 
monopsonist/monopolist will and, as a consequence, will import less than it for any given 
level of total sales.  However, the total quantity sold will differ between equations (1) and (2) 
and it is not possible to conclude a priori whether the quantity imported by the STE will be 
greater or less than the quantity imported by the private firm, even if it is concluded that the 
share of imports is greater.  Nevertheless, it is possible to conclude that the STE does have an 
effect on trade:  it acts like a tariff when it imports less than does the benchmark;  and it acts 
like an import subsidy if it imports more than does the benchmark. 
  The model is set up in such a way that the tariff equivalent of the STE, 
e t , which may 
be positive or negative, is solved for such that  ()
eS T E
mm Qt Q = , where  m Q  is quantity imported 
by the private firm(s) in the benchmark.  In other words, we find a 
e t  such that the import 
volumes under the two market structures are identical and where, in each case, the optimal 
                                                 
8 The intuition which follows can be modified to account for an objective function which is biased towards 
consumers rather than producers.  In comparing the outcomes for the consumer-biased with the producer-biased 
cases, it would be anticipated that the STE would import more in the former than in the latter case and, thus, 
would generate a smaller tariff equivalent.   8
volumes of imports and domestic procurement are solved from equations (1) and (2) as a 
third-degree, price discriminating single buyer problem. 
  We assume specific values for the parameters of the linear demand and supply 
equations in the model.
9  Using these representative values, the ad valorem tariff equivalent 
of the STE was computed for different values of n, the number of firms that might replace the 
STE were it totally deregulated, for two different objective functions and sets of exclusive 
rights.
10  The results are shown in Figure 1. 
  For the producer-biased, single desk STE (PS max) the results confirm the intuition 
presented above, namely, that the STE impedes market access from the perspective of the 
exporting region.  In particular, as n increases and the buying power of the industry 
diminishes, imports increase because total sales increase with reduced selling power, and the 
gap between the quantity imported by the private firms and the STE widens, as reflected in 
the monotonically increasing tariff equivalent of the STE.  The tariff equivalent of the STE 
ranges from 33 per cent (at n = 1) to 65 per cent (at n = 10).  Therefore, the more competitive 
the benchmark that would replace this STE, the greater is the apparent restriction of market 
access caused by the STE.  In the consumer-biased case (CS max), the tariff equivalent of the 
STE is smaller than that for the producer-biased STE but for values of n > 2, the STE still 
restricts imports when compared with the benchmark;  the tariff equivalent ranges from an 
import subsidy of 77 per cent to a tariff of 25 per cent.  Hence, an STE tends to be less trade 
distorting if its objective function is biased towards domestic consumers rather than 
producers. 
Now change the exclusive rights of the STE from single desk to import only and 
exclude the STE from domestic procurement but retain the assumption that the STE is 
                                                 
9 Details of the derivations used to solve this model and the values used for the demand and supply parameters 
are available upon request. 
10 Elsewhere in the importing country case, we have analysed the trade and welfare effects of partial 
deregulation of the STE rather than its total removal as here (for example, see McCorriston and MacLaren 
(2005a)).   9
producer-biased (Imp PS max).  Domestic procurement is carried out by a number of private, 
profit-maximising firms.  This change is accomplished in equation (1) by removing  d π  and in 
equation (2) by removing 
i
m q .  The effect on trade is to reduce the tariff equivalent when 
compared with the corresponding single desk STE because the STE now can only obtain 
profits from imports and influence producer surplus indirectly.  Hence, this weakening of 
exclusive rights reduces the size of the trade distortion even where the objective function is 
the same (Figure 1). 
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4.  Importing STEs:  the effect on producer subsidy equivalent 
The STE not only affects imports and generally acts like a tariff but it also affects the sales of 
domestic producers and acts like an amber box instrument because it determines the 
producers' selling price.  To measure the domestic producer subsidy equivalent of the STE, 
P s , which may be positive (a subsidy) or negative (a tax), the model is solved for 
P s  such 
that ( )
PS T E
dd Qs Q = , where  d Q  is quantity purchased from domestic suppliers by the private 
firm(s) in the benchmark.  In other words, we find 
P s  such that the quantities purchased from   10
domestic suppliers under the two market structures are identical.  Using the calibrated model 
as before, the values of the domestic producer subsidy equivalent were calculated for both 
types of single desk STE.  The results are shown in Figure 2. 
  The producer-biased and consumer-biased STEs tax domestic producers except for n 
≤ 2 and n ≤ 4, respectively.  In conjunction with the results in Figure 1, it may be concluded 
that both types of STE restrict imports and decrease domestic procurement relative to that in 
the benchmark.  Given the bias towards producers in the STE's objective function, the first 
result should hold no surprises, whereas the second does.  The explanation is that the pro-
competitive effect of an increasing number of firms in the benchmark eventually outweighs 
the domestic expansion effect of the STE when compared with a monopsony/monopoly 
benchmark.  The case of the import-only STE and (n – 1) domestic firms may be regarded as 
a partially deregulated STE when compared with the producer-biased single desk STE.  Such 
deregulation changes the producer tax to a producer subsidy for  3 n ≥ . 
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   11
5.  Importing STEs: The Welfare Effects 
  As a consequence of distorting trade, domestic production and domestic consumption, 
the STE will also affect the components of social welfare within the country and the gains 
from trade for the exporting region.  These components of welfare were calculated from the 
calibrated model and are shown in Figure 3 for the STE when compared with the 
corresponding values for a benchmark of n = 5 firms.  When the STE has only import rights, 
the number of private firms with exclusive procurement in the domestic market is set to 4, 
giving a total of 5 firms, as in the benchmark.  Each of the single desk STEs reduces the level 
of overall welfare in the exporting region regardless of the policy bias in its objective 
function or the nature of it exclusive rights but it is most detrimental in the producer-biased 
case and least so in the consumer-biased case in which there are additional sales.  Welfare for 
the importing country is reduced by a producer-biased STE but is increased slightly in the 
import-only case.  The STE reduces the welfare of consumers in all cases but particularly 
where is producer-biased and has single desk status.  It also reduces the surplus of producers 
in the single desk cases but increases it otherwise.  These outcomes can be explained as 
follows.  Compared with a benchmark of 5 firms, the producer-biased single desk STE acts 
like a domestic producer tax (see Figure 2) and reduces producer surplus, whereas the 
consumer-biased STE acts in an almost neutral fashion in the neighbourhood of n=5.  For the 
import-only STE, domestic procurement is from 4 firms which is not very different from the 
number of firms in the benchmark.  The level of profits in the economy is higher in all cases 
than in the benchmark with the producer-biased single desk STE bringing about the greatest 
increase.   12
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6. Case Study: Korean Rice 
Korea is a major player in agricultural trade, being one of the main agricultural importers for 
a range of agricultural commodities including rice, barley, wheat, beef, soybeans.  To manage 
these imports, it typically employs state trading enterprises. Our focus is on rice where the 
STE (specifically the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, MAF) is the sole importer. 
Agricultural policy in Korea is biased towards producers, with this bias being reflected in 
high values for the Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents. Korea has resisted attempts 
to put importing state trading on the Doha Round negotiating agenda arguing that the main 
distortion arises from exporting, not importing, countries. To consider this argument, we 
collected price and quantity data to calibrate the theoretical model to the Korean rice market 
for a single year. Reflecting the bias in Korean rice policy, the assumed weight on consumer 
surplus is zero and it is assumed that MAF is concerned solely with domestic producer 
surplus and profits (equation (1)). Given its role in managing imports of rice, we concluded 
that the import-only STE model described above (section 3) is the most appropriate   13
representation of the situation in Korea, i.e. that MAF is responsible for all imports but plays 
no role in the domestic procurement market.
11  
The values for the trade distorting and producer subsidy measures and the associated 
welfare effects are shown in Table 1. We assume in terms of the underlying benchmark that it 
would be competitive with n=20. As can be seen from the table, the STE gives rise to a 
Table 1: The Impact of the STE in the Korean Rice Market: 
percentage change from the benchmark 
Ad Valorem Tariff Equivalent 178 
Ad Valorem Producer Subsidy  25 
Change in Domestic Producer Surplus  4 
Change in Domestic Consumer Surplus  −6 
Change in Profits (Domestic and Import)  13 
Change in Domestic Welfare  −0.4 
Change in Exporter Welfare  −70 
 
significant ad valorem tariff equivalent, although the producer subsidy equivalent is much 
smaller. The reasons for the relative sizes of these effects are two-fold. First, since MAF has 
exclusive rights relating to imports only, it is more likely to affect imports than domestic 
output. Second, the ad valorem effects also depend on the denominator used to calculate each 
tax/subsidy. This is especially pertinent if the government uses additional measures to distort  
(i.e. increase) the domestic price producer received hence making the producer subsidy effect 
relatively low and, if it can generate terms of trade effects making the tariff equivalent effect 
relatively high. It is nevertheless clear that the Korean STE can inhibit market access 
significantly which will remain even if other traditional policy measures are reduced in any 
Doha Round agreement. The welfare effects are consistent with these outcomes. The effect 
                                                 
11 Further details on the data and the calibration are available upon request.   14
on domestic producers and consumers is relatively low with the more substantive effects 
arising through the increase in profits due to the restrictions on imports and the associated 
terms of trade effects and a significant decrease in exporters’ gains from trade. In effect, with 
the STE having exclusive rights to import only, there is a profit shifting effect from exporters 
to importers (via the STE) though domestic welfare still falls, albeit marginally. 
7.  Summary and Conclusions 
In the Doha Round of trade negotiations in agriculture, the emphasis is being placed on 
improving market access, especially for the agricultural products from the developing and 
least-developed countries destined for the markets of the developed countries.  Despite this 
aim, importing STEs are not a separate item on the agenda as is the case with exporting 
STEs.  It has been shown through the results obtained that the negotiators are missing an 
opportunity to improve market access because they are ignoring the trade effects of importing 
STEs.  If importing STEs in developed country were to be removed and the domestic and 
import markets totally deregulated, the volume of imports and the prices received for imports 
would increase, and exporting countries would gain substantially in terms of welfare.  The 
importing country would also gain from this deregulation as overall welfare would increase.  
Even producers would benefit from the removal of the producer-biased single desk STE but 
not from the other two STEs.  It has also been shown that the single desk STE with a 
producer bias acts like a producer tax when compared with the benchmark, although with 
import rights only it behaves like a producer subsidy.  This characteristic of an importing 
STE is also missing from the negotiations.  Similar conclusions hold for importing STEs in 
developing and least-developed countries which are consumer-biased, although the 
magnitudes of the various results tend to smaller than in the developed country case but, 
nevertheless, are significant.   15
  It was remarked earlier that the twin objectives of efficiency and redistribution make 
the analysis of STEs difficult.  It has been shown in the analysis undertaken that it is 
interaction of market structure (and the degree of market failure), exclusive rights and 
objectives which make the analysis a challenge.  Importantly, the framework outlined here 
can be used to analyse the impacts of STEs that arise in different environments and where 
differences in exclusive rights apply. The framework also provides a basis for evaluating the 
welfare effects of STEs that arise in practice, as the case study of the Korean STE involved in 
importing rice demonstrates. Given the various assumptions made, and consistent with the 
results of the Korean case study, both exporting countries and the importing countries that 
use STEs would be better off without them. 
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